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LIST OF PARTIES ON APPEAL
The caption contains a list of all parties involved in this
action below.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j)and Utah R.App.P.3.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

The District Court properly granted Defendants Summary

Judgment when the insurance policy in question was not ambiguous
and

the

plain

language

of

the

exclusion

did

not

cover

the

Plaintiff's loss of oil caused by corrosion.
Standard of Review: Upon review of a grant of summary judgment, the
Supreme Court applies the same standard as that applied by the
trial court.

Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1977).

Utah R.Civ.P.56(c) provides that summary judgment is appropriate
"if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
2.

Plaintiff's bad faith and fraud claims were properly

dismissed by the trial court as a matter of law.
Standard

of

Review:

When

the

trial

court

concludes

that

the

Defendant's denial of coverage was proper and is not subject to any
claim for bad faith or fraudulent insurance acts, this Court should

1

apply that standard espoused by Utah R.Civ.P.56(c) as to whether
any genuine issue of material fact exists, while implementing a
correction of error standard as to legal questions.

See generally

Camp v. Office of Recovery Services, 779 P.2d 242,244(Utah Ct.App.
1989).
3.
The supplemental affidavit of Richard P. Smoot and the
declaration of Jim Pinneo (both proposed by the Plaintiff) were
properly subject to a Motion to Strike• Utah R.Civ.P.56(e) only
permits affidavits to be filed in support or opposition to a Motion
for Summary Judgment which "set forth such facts cis would be
admissible in evidence."
Standard of Review:

"Affidavits of experts are insufficient to

defeat summary judgment unless foundational facts are set forth
submitting

their

opinions

and

conclusions."

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 832 P.2d 858, 864 n.2

King

v.

Searle

(Utah 1992), Bodger

v.Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 752 (Utah 1996).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances
or regulations that are determinative of the issues in this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE,

Plaintiff,

S.W.

Energy

Corporation,

filed

suit

against

Colonial Insurance Company and Marine Office of America Corporation
(sometimes collectively referred to as "MOAC" or "CNA") to compel
performance

of

CNA's

alleged

obligations

under

a

contract

of

insurance and to recover damages and attorney fees as a result of

2

CNA's alleged breach of contract and alleged bad faith rejection of
plaintiff's claim for coverage for the loss of plaintiff's oil due
to corrosion of its holding tank.
After conducting minimal

discovery and after CNA filed a

motion in support of a more definite statement (to which plaintiff
never responded) plaintiff

filed a motion

for partial

summary

judgment arguing -that the policy in question must be construed as
a matter of law in plaintiff's favor.

Plaintiff also argued that

it was entitled to recover the value of the oil from CNA and
asserted that CNA breached its duty of good faith under the policy,
thus entitling plaintiff to recover its costs and attorney fees.
In

opposition,

CNA

filed

a

counter

motion

for

summary

judgment, successfully asserting that (a) the plain language of the
exclusion did not cover the plaintiff's loss of oil caused by
corrosion; (b) the undisputed facts demonstrated that the oil tank
corroded

excluding

coverage

as

a

matter

of

law;

and,

(c)

plaintiff's bad faith and fraud claims should be dismissed as a
matter of law.
B,

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW,

On August 1, 1996, S.W. Energy Corporation filed suit against
CNA claiming breach of contract, breach of covenants of good faith
and

fair

dealing,

insurance

fraud,

conversion

and

breach

of

fiduciary duty for CNA's refusal to cover plaintiff's loss of oil
caused by the corrosion of its holding tank.

3

(Rl-9) CNA answered

plaintiff's

Complaint

asserting

all

appropriate

affirmative

defenses (R51-60) and within 60 days thereafter filed a motion for
a more definite statement on plaintiff's allegations of fraud.
(R70-85)
Instead

of

opposing

CNA's

motion

for

a

more

definite

statement, plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment
asserting that it was entitled to recover the value of the oil from
CNA and that the court should rule that CNA had breached its duty
of good faith under the policy. (R87-115)
In response, CNA filed a cross motion for summary judgment
asserting that (a) under Utah law dealing with the interpretation
of

insurance

exclusion

contracts

did

not

the plain

cover

language

plaintiff's

loss

of

the

of

appropriate

oil

caused

by

corrosion; (b) the undisputed facts demonstrated that the oil tank
corroded

excluding

coverage

as

a

matter

of

law;

and,

(c)

plaintiff's bad faith and fraud claims were properly dismissible.
(R135-204)
After plaintiff attempted to file a supplemental affidavit and
a "declaration" of two "fact witnesses," CNA moved to strike the
same

asserting

that

the

statements

were

inadmissible

and

unsupported by adequate foundation. (R244-45,253-256)
On June 23, 1997, the court heard oral argument on this matter
and in part ruled:
"I'm going to deny summary judgment for
Plaintiff. I'm going to grant partial summary

4

judgment for the Defendant, finding that the
clear language of the insurance contract, loss
or damage caused by can also be read to mean
loss or damage resulting from.
Finding that if the loss of the tank - if
the hole was caused by rust or corrosion, and
the oil leaked through that hole, that the
insurance contract does not insure that loss.
I think that is the interpretation that
can be garnered from a plain reading of the
language.
I understand that there are
certainly ways of reading things differently
and I recognize that case law suggests that if
an insurance contract is subject to reasonably
be read two different ways, that it ought to
be construed against the drafter, so that as
broad a coverage as can be
reasonably
contemplated ought to be enforced.
I'm just - it's a struggle for me to read
"caused by" to limit it simply to the item
that is corroded or the item that is rusted or
the item that is damaged by vermin or by
freezing or by mechanical breakdown; but ought
to properly be read to include those items
which are a direct consequence of the excluded
items."
(R277 at p.39)
Thereafter, at the request of plaintiff's counsel, the court
essentially

ruled on plaintiff's bad faith claims by concluding

that (a) the loss in question was not covered; (b) CNA did not "take
a tortured or strained reading to avoid coverages as a business
decision"; and

(c) CNA's motivation was an

"appropriate, fair

reading of the language in the contract." (R277 at pg. 43)
Thereafter on October 1, 1997, the court entered its Findings
of Facts and Conclusions of Law and ordered:
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
When the language of a policy of
insurance is susceptible to two or more
plausible interpretations, the language is
ambiguous and must be construed in favor of
coverage to the insured.
2.
The language in the MOAC policy of
insurance covering exclusions from coverage
contained only one plausible interpretation
and therefore is clear and unambiguous.
3 . The loss of the oil was caused by
rust or corrosion within the meaning of the
exclusion from coverage in the insurance
policy.
4. Based upon the clear language of the
contract, Defendant MOAC properly denied
coverage for the claim for lost oil presented
by S.W. Energy.
5.
S.W. Energy's
judgment is denied.

motion

for

summary

6. Because MOAC's denial of coverage was
proper and timely/ MOAC is not subject to any
claim for bad faith, fraudulent insurance
acts, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty or
punitive damages.
7.
An insurer does not violate its
obligation of good faith and fair dealing to
an insured by denying coverage when an insured
claims a different interpretation of the
insurance policy so long as the insurer has no
bad motive in denying coverage.
8.
MOAC's cross
judgment is granted.

motion

for

summary

ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby
order that Plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment is denied.
Defendant's motion for

6

summary judgment on all claims is granted."
(R267-268)
Plaintiff appealed the court's ruling on October 30, 1997.
(R270-271)
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
1.

The loss at issue in this case occurred on November 27,

1995, when an oil tank on plaintiff's site ruptured spilling the
oil contained in the tank^Rl-g) 1
2.

At the time of the loss, the Plaintiff was insured by an

"Oil and Gas Lease Property" policy issued by MOAC a subsidiary of
Defendant CNA.
3.

See Exhibit "A".(R138,157-158)

The relevant policy insuring agreement and exclusionary

language provided:
THIS POLICY INSURES AGAINST:
All risks of direct physical loss of or damage
to the property covered except as hereinafter
provided.
THIS POLICY DOES NOT INSURE AGAINST:
Loss or damage caused by vermin, wear and
tear,
gradual
deterioration
or
inherent
defect, rust, corrosion, freezing, faulty
design ....
See Exhibit "A". (R138,157-158)
x

Defense counsel on appeal includes the same firm that
participated
in
the
motion
for
summary
judgment
below.
Accordingly, defense counsel may at times repeat verbatim their
argument below, without quotation marks but with record citations
added.
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4.
1995

The notice of loss which was sent to CNA on December 14,

contained

a description

exploded on site of oil field."
5.

of

the

loss

as

"Bottom

of

tank

See Exhibit "B".(R138,159)

The notice provided by Swett & Crawford to CNA repeated

the loss statement

describing

the loss as an explosion.

See

Exhibit "C" . An additional notice of loss sent to CNA repeated the
loss statement describing the loss as an explosion. (R138,160)
6.

In its diary of the matter, the CNA adjuster initially

noted that the plaintiff was making a claim for the lost oil.

The

diary entry reflects a review of the policy noting that it "covers
crude oil

in tanks with exclusions of wear and tear, gradual

deterioration,

rust, corrosion

and

so on."

See Exhibit

"D",

p.l.(R138-139,161).
7.

On December 15, 1995, the adjuster's diary reflects that

the CNA Heavy Equipment division was assigned to travel to Utah to
inspect the tank and investigate the loss.

See Exhibit "D", p.2.

(R139,162; see also R163-168).
8.

On January 11, 1996 the company, "Double Tank" submitted

an estimate for the cost of repairing the tank.

In its proposal,

the company stated that the tank had failed because of corrosion
and temperature change.
9.

See Exhibit "E".(R139,169-178)

On January 12, 1996 CNA's status report indicated that it

had requested a copy of the BLM incident report as part of its
investigation of the incident. See Exhibit

8

U

F" .

(R139,179-182).

10.

The BLM investigation concluded that the oil spilled as

a result of corrosion to the tank.

On February 8, 1996, less than

two months after first being notified of the loss, CNA informed
S.W. Energy of the results of its investigation.

By that same

letter CNA stated, "we must decline coverage in this matter in its
totality." (emphasis added).
11.

See Exhibit "G".(R139,183).

No additional contact with plaintiff is noted in the

record until over two months later when CNA received a letter from
plaintiff's counsel dated April 10, 1996 requesting reconsideration
of the denial of coverage based on alleged

"misunderstandings"

which plaintiff believed led to the denial of coverage for the oil.
Specifically, plaintiff's counsel was under the impression that CNA
had not addressed the claim for loss of the oil.

See Exhibit

"H". (R139-140,184-188) .
12.

After

receiving

this

letter,

CNA

reopened

its

investigation of the matter and hired an independent inspector,
Garrett

Engineers,

to

investigate

the

loss.

See

Exhibit

"I". (R140,189-200) .
13.

On May 5, 1996 Garrett Engineers conducted a supplemental

investigation of the incident at CNA's expense.
14.

On June 5, 1996 Garrett Engineers provided its report to

CNA regarding its investigation.
15.

Id.

Id.

That same day, CNA confirmed to plaintiff's counsel its

denial of coverage for the entire claim (i.e. lost oil) based upon
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the "corrosion exclusion".

The letter clearly stated that the

factual investigation revealed, "corrosion of the tank as the cause
of the oil seepage."

filed

See Exhibit "J". (R140,201).

16.

Plaintiff filed suit on August 1, 1996. (Rl)

17.

After limited discovery was exchanged in this case, CNA

a

motion

for

more

definite

statement

on

plaintiff's

allegations of fraud. See (R70-76).
18.

Rather than opposing CNA's motion for a more definite

statement, plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment
arguing that the policy covered the loss of the oil and that CNA
had breached its duty of good faith under the policy. (R87-114).
19.

CNA filed a cross-motion for summary judgment asserting

that (a) under Utah law interpreting insurance contracts the policy
language at issue did not cover plaintiff's loss of oil caused by
corrosion;

(b) the undisputed facts demonstrated that the tank

corroded excluding coverage as a matter of law; and (c) plaintiff's
bad faith and fraud claims should be dismissed as a matter of law.
(R135-204 including exhibits)
20.

Almost a month after CNA filed its cross-motion for

summary judgment, plaintiff filed the Supplemental Affidavit of
Richard P. Smoot and the "Declaration of Jim Pinneo" .

In his

Affidavit Mr. Smoot identified himself as plaintiff's president and
without laying any foundation for the same, attempted to offer
expert opinions regarding the cause of the loss:

10

7. Photograph No. 1 shows that much of
the surface of the tank is covered by a very
thin layer of rust, as is normal for tanks of
this age and type of construction. However,
the rust is only superficial, and does not
adversely affect the strength or integrity of
the steel plate.
•

•

*

12 . The outlet through which crude oil
is removed from the tank is located several
inches above the bottom of the tank, as shown
in Photograph No.2. Therefore, even when the
crude oil in the tank is drained as fully as
possible and loaded into trucks for shipment
to a refinery, several inches of crude oil
remain in the bottom of the tank.
•

•

*

14.
The tank includes a hot oil
recirculating system, which was installed as
part of the tank's original design and
construction.
The
purpose
of
the
recirculating system is to pump and circulate
heated crude oil into the tank, thereby
circulating, mixing and heating the oil in the
tank to facilitate removal into oil tanker
trucks for transportation to an oil refinery.
•

*

*

17. The tank failed at the point where
one of the legs of the support plate was
welded to the floor of the tank, as shown in
Photographs No. 3,4 and 5.
The welds
attaching the other three legs to the tank
floor are still sound and intact.
•

*

*

19.
The crude oil produced from the
subject well has a relatively high proportion
of paraffin which, being heavier than other
fractions, settles to the bottom of the tank.
Thus, not only was the point of failure never
exposed to air, it was continuously coated

11

with paraffin while the tank was in use.
*

•

*

21. Following removal of the protective
paraffin coating, the point of failure was
initially completely free of any sign of rust
or corrosion, and was shiny
silver
in
appearance.
22.
Since the steam cleaning, as a
result of being exposed to the air (in
combination with residual moisture from the
steam cleaning and subsequent rain and snow),
a thin film of rust has formed on the newlyexposed metal surfaces on the interior of the
tank, as shown in Photographs No. 2,3 and 4
(which were taken after nearly a year of
exposure to air and moisture since the tank
failure) . However, so long as the tank was in
use, and until the steam cleaning removed the
protective paraffin coating, corrosion and
rust were physically impossible at the point
of failure.
23.
The failure of the tank was not
caused by corrosion/ but by the failure of the
weld attaching one of the recirculating system
support legs to the floor of the tank.
24.
After the weld broke loose, the
vibration
of
the
recirculating
syst€*m
apparently caused the now-loosened leg to rub
against the floor of the tank, wearing away
much of the leg and simultaneously wearing a
hole in the steel plate or the tank floor,
until the leg finally punched through the
remaining thin layer of steel on November 26,
1995, causing the sudden loss of the contents
of the tank.
25. The pitting and cratering caused by
the repeated movement of the leg against the
tank floor, as well as the tapered hole worn from the inside of the tank toward the
outside - are clearly visible in Photograph
No. 5.
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•

•

•

28.
The insurance companies' false
characterization of the tank failure and oil
loss flies in the face of the actual, clearly
observed facts: There was no seepage or
leakage of oil whatsoever prior to the sudden
and catastrophic failure of the tank. There
was no corrosion, slowly enlarging the hole
month after month. The hole occurred suddenly
and unexpectedly when the broken support leg
finally punched through the floor of the tank
on the - night of November 26, 1995, and the
entire tank contents were lost before the next
morning.
29.
When this lawsuit was originally
filed, S.W. Energy sought only the value of
the lost crude oil. While we still believe
that the damage to the tank was ultimately
caused by the broken weld, and is therefore
also a covered loss under the policy, the
insurers steadfastly (and wrongly) continue to
assert that the tank was damaged by rust or
corrosion."
(R208-211) (emphasis added).
21.

The

Declaration

of

Jim

Pinneo

similarly

foundation:
6. As of later afternoon on November 26,
1995 and prior to that time, there was and had
been no loss, leakage or seepage of oil from
the subject tank. Furthermore, prior to the
morning of November 27, 1995, there was no
indication of any impending failure of the
tank.
•

*

*

8. After the tank failed,
floor and walls of the tank were
by crude oil (paraffin) , and
possible to examine the hole or
cause of the failure in detail.

13

the interior
still coated
it was not
evaluate the

lacked

•

*

*

10. Following removal of the protective
coating, the interior walls and floor of the
tank were initially free of any sign of rust
or corrosion.
In particular, the point of
failure - where a broken support had punched
through the floor of the tank - was shiny
silver in appearance.
11.
The interior surfaces of the tank
are currently exposed to air and moisture
through openings in the roof and pipe fittings
in the wall and floor. As a result, a thin
film of rust has formed on the newly-exposed
metal surfaces on the interior of the tank
since the tank was taken out of service."
(R219-220)
22.

CNA filed a motion to strike the affidavits as lacking

foundation (R253-256) and plaintiff opposed the same. (R258-262)
23.

On June 23, 1997, the parties appeared before the court

and the Honorable William A. Thorne ruled in part as follows:
"I'm going to deny summary judgment for
Plaintiff. I'm going to grant partial summary
judgment for the Defendant, finding that the
clear language of the insurance contract, loss
or damage caused by can also be read to mean
loss or damage resulting from.
Finding that if the loss of the tank - if
the hole was caused by rust or corrosion, and
the oil leaked through that hole, that the
insurance contract does not insure that loss.
I think that is the interpretation that
can be garnered from a plain reading of the
language.
I understand that there are
certainly
ways
[sic] of
reading
things
differently and I recognize that case law
suggests that if an insurance contract is
subject to reasonably be read two different
ways, that it ought to be construed against
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the drafter, so that as broad a coverage as
can be reasonably contemplated ought to be
enforced.
I'm just - it's a struggle for me to read
"caused by" to limit it simply to the item
that is corroded or the item that is rusted or
the item that is damaged by vermin or by
freezing or by mechanical breakdown; but ought
to properly be read to include those items
which are a direct consequence of the excluded
items."
(R277 at p.39)
24.

Thereafter on October 1, 1997, the court entered Findings

of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The hole in the tank in which the oil
was being stored was caused by rust.
2. The oil was lost because of the hole
in the tank.
3.
The oil itself was not rusted or
corroded. However, since the hole in the tank
was caused by rust or corrosion, the loss of
the oil was also caused by rust or corrosion.
4. The decision by MOAC to deny coverage
was the result of a reasonable reading of the
language of the exclusion.
5.
fashion.

MOAC denied

coverage

in a timely

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
When the language of a policy of
insurance is susceptible to two or more
plausible interpretations, the language is
ambiguous and must be construed in favor of
coverage to the insured.
2. The language in the MOAC policy of
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insurance covering exclusions from coverage
contained only one plausible interpretation
and therefore is clear and unambiguous.
3.
The loss of the oil was caused by
rust or corrosion within the meaning of the
exclusion from coverage in the insurance
policy.
4. Based upon the clear language of the
contract, defendant MOAC properly denied
coverage for the claim for lost oil presented
by S.W. Energy.
5.
S.W. Energy's
judgment is denied.

motion

for

summary

6. Because MOAC's denial of coverage was
proper and timely, MOAC is not subject to any
claim for bad faith, fraudulent insurance
acts, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty or
punitive damages.
7.
An insurer does not violate its
obligation of good faith and fair dealing to
an insured by denying coverage when an insured
claims a different interpretation of the
insurance policy so long as the insurer has no
bad motive in denying coverage.
8.
MOAC's cross
judgment is granted.

motion

for

summary

ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby
order that Plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment is denied.
Defendants' motion for
summary judgment on all claims is granted.
DATED this 1st day of October, 1997.
BY THE COURT:
WILLIAM A. THORNE
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
(R266-268)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly concluded that the loss of oil
claimed by S.W. Energy was specifically and clearly excluded under
the plain and unambiguous language of the CNA insurance policy.
S.W. Energy's proposed construction of the policy is contrary to
the plain language of the policy and to applicable Utah laws of
contract construction.
In addition, the trial court appropriately concluded that CNA
made a prompt and appropriate investigation of the claim and acted
directly

and

promptly

in denying

coverage.

Since

the

court

concluded that CNA's interpretation of the policy in its denial of
coverage was accurate, any bad faith claim or other causes of
action fail as a matter of law.
Finally,

since the supplemental

affidavit

and

declaration

offered by plaintiff to oppose summary judgment were based upon
statements lacking foundation, they were appropriately subject to
a motion to strike.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED CNA SUMMARY JUDGMENT
SINCE THE PLAIN AND UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF THE POLICY
EXCLUSION DID NOT COVER THE PLAINTIFFS LOSS OF OIL
CAUSED BY CORROSION AND THE UNDISPUTED FACTS DEMONSTRATED
THAT THE TANK CORRODED.
A.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS.

As presented to the trial court below2:
In Utah, summary judgment is proper where
there are no genuine issues of material fact
in dispute and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. See Village Inn
Apartments v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co.,
790 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah App. 1990).
In the
context
of
insurance
policies,
the
interpretation of its terms is a question of
law. Alf v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 850
P.2d 1272, 1274 (Utah 1993).
Further, the
question of whether a policy provision is
ambiguous
is a question of law to be
determined by the court. Id.
With respect to Plaintiff's claims of bad
faith, the trial court properly determined as
a matter of law that Defendant's conduct in
this matter was reasonable since CNA was
entitled to summary judgment. Even if CNA had
not been entitled to summary judgment the
court could conclude that Defendant's conduct
was reasonable under the "fairly debatable"
standard. See Billings v. Union Bankers Ins.
Co., 918 P.2d 461, 464 (Utah 1996).
R at 141-142

2

For purposes of the following argument, CNA reincorporates
its analysis at R141-155 and R246-251. In addressing its motion to
strike, CNA also reincorporates the argument at R253-256.
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B. UNDER UTAH LAW, INSURANCE COMPANIES IN UTAH ARE TO BE
INTERPRETED LIKE ORDINARY CONTRACTS,
As this court succinctly reiterated in First American Title
Insurance Co. v. J.B. Ranch, Inc., 34 3 Utah Adv. Rep.6,7(May 12,
1998, #960530) :
"[a]n insurance policy is merely a contract
between the insured and the insurer and is
construed pursuant to the same rules applied
to ordinary contracts." (stating that "the
terms of insurance contracts . . . are to be
interpreted in accordance with their usually
accepted meanings and should be read as a
whole, in an attempt to harmonize and give
effect to all of the contract provisions").
In sum, "if a policy is not ambiguous, no
presumption in favor of the insured arises and
the policy language is construed according to
its usual and ordinary meaning.
Moreover, . . . the foregoing rule also
applies to policy provisions excepting certain
losses from coverage. It is well settled that
an "insurer may exclude certain losses from
coverage if it uses 'language which clearly
and unmistakably communicates to the insured
the specific circumstances under which the
expected coverage will not be provided.'" A
provision
excepting
certain
losses
from
coverage
is
therefore
not
automatically
construed against the insurer. Rather, it is
only when the insurer uses language that is
ambiguous, that "doubt is resolved against the
insurer".
A policy is ambiguous only if it is not
"plain to a person of ordinary intelligence
and
understanding."
A
contract
may
be
ambiguous because it is unclear or omits terms
or ... "if the terms used to express the
intention of the parties may be understood to
have
two
or
more
plausible
meanings."
However, policy terms are not necessarily
ambiguous just because one party seeks to
endow them with a different interpretation
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according to his or her own interests.
Rather, the other interpretation proposed must
be plausible and reasonable in light of the
language used.
(Citations omitted).
C. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE EXCLUSION DOES NOT COVER
THE PLAINTIFFS LOSS OF OIL CAUSED BY CORROSION,
Plaintiff's

entire

argument

is seemingly

premised

on the

argument that the exclusionary clause does not mirror the insuring
clause and is, therefore, ambiguous in application and must be
interpreted to include coverage.3
Plaintiff essentially argued that the conflict between the
coverage and exclusionary clauses creates an ambiguity.

Plaintiff

then argued that because the insuring clause speaks of "direct
physical losses" the exclusionary language should also be construed
to exclude only "direct physical losses" to cure the ambiguity.
See Plaintiff's brief, at pg. 9. Plaintiff concluded by arguing
that the ambiguity in coverage must be resolved in its favor based
on its reasonable expectation-of coverage.

Id. at pg. 10.

While

the logic of the argument has some initial appeal, plaintiff's
3

Plaintiff argues:
The policy excluded coverage for "loss or damage" caused by rust or
corrosion, reading the insuring clause (which insured against "direct"
loss or damage) together with the exclusion, the Policy clearly excluded
"direct" loss caused by corrosion - i.e., any holes in or other damage
to the tank directly caused by corrosion. . . . However, the oil did not
corrode, it was lost because it was unexpectedly and accidently spilled
out onto the ground. A reasonable insured would understand the loss of
the oil to be covered by the insurance for which he had paid premiums
year after year, even if the Tank itself was not.
See, Plaintiff's brief, at

9-10.
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foundational premise -- that the insuring and exclusionary clauses
are inconsistent and therefore ambiguous --is fundamentally flawed
in two respects.
First, it is plaintiff's own proposed interpretation of the
exclusionary clause which creates the alleged ambiguity.

Indeed,

plaintiff's proposed construction is contrary to the plain language
of the clause.

According to Utah's rules of construction, if the

plain meaning of the clause is unambiguous, the ordinary meaning of
the term will be applied by the Court.

See Alf v. State Farm and

Cas.Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Utah 1993).
Second, plaintiff's attempt to "force harmony and consistency7'
between the insuring clause and the exclusionary clause is contrary
to Utah

law.

Under Utah

law, conflicts

between

an

insuring

agreement and the language of the exclusionary clause do not render
a policy ambiguous.

In fact, this Court

in Alf, ^rejected an

insured's attempt to have conflicts between an insuring clause
language

and exclusionary

clause

considered

ambiguous

so that

coverage could be found.
The plaintiffs in Alf sued their insurer for coverage when a
water pipe burst and eroded their land, causing subsidence to their
insured

property.

subsidence

exclusion

The
in

insurer
the

denied

policy

and

coverage
the

based

plaintiffs

on

a

sued.

Similar to the claims in this case, the plaintiffs in Alf evidently
argued that "the policy's explicit coverage for broken pipes and
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the exclusion denying recover for damage caused by earth movement
(which was, in turn, caused by a broken pipe) renders coverage so
doubtful and uncertain that the Policy is ambiguous." Alf, at 1274.
The plaintiffs in Alf were apparently arguing what plaintiff
is asserting here; namely that the conflicts between the insuring
clause and the exclusionary clause create an ambiguity
policy which must be resolved in favor of coverage.

in the

This Court

rejected the argument stating:
The alleged ambiguity is not a result of unclear
language.
Instead, the Alfs claim the exclusion is
inconsistent with the expected coverage and that the
inconsistency creates an ambiguity in the policy.
However, this logic would prevent application of any
exclusion since exclusions are necessarily inconsistent
with coverage.
Alf,

at

1275

(emphasis added) .

This Court

then

specifically

declined to find that conflicts between the insuring clause and the
exclusionary clause rendered the policy "ambiguous", because such
a ruling

"would render any exclusion invalid simply because it

conflicts with the stated coverage in some way." Id.
Similarly, in this case plaintiff's entire argument succeeds
or fails based on plaintiff's own presumption that the alleged
conflicts between the insuring clause and the exclusionary clause
create ambiguity when applied to the facts.

Plaintiff's initial

premise (that the exclusionary language must be modified to exclude
"only direct losses" in this case) has been specifically rejected
by this Court in the Alf case as an improper rule of contract
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construction, and plaintiff has failed to distinguish these facts
from that decision.
Plaintiff's claim is further defeated by the this Court's
analysis of the "causation" issue in Alf.

The plaintiffs in Alf

apparently argued that the exclusionary clause should not apply
because

of

the

"efficient

proximate

cause"

doctrine.

The

plaintiffs also evidently claimed that the broken pipe (a covered
loss) was the efficient cause of the subsidence (an excluded loss)
and should, therefore, not have been excluded under the policy.
Alf at 1275.

In response, this Court seemingly recognized that the

"efficient proximate cause" doctrine should be acknowledged in Utah
in

certain

circumstances.

Indeed

the

Court

ruled

that,

in

determining coverage, "the efficient cause - the one that sets
others

in motion

- is the cause to which

attributed." Alf, at 1277.

the

loss

This Court, however,

is to be

specifically

limited the application of the efficient clause doctrine to cases
"only when the parties have not chose to freely contract out of
it." Alf, at 1277.

The Court then stated that plain language of

the policy in Alf clearly excluded the loss, rendering the doctrine
inapplicable.
As in Alf, the plain language of the policy in the present
case does not permit application of the efficient proximate cause
rule.

As in Alf there is no ambiguity in the language of the

exclusionary clause.

However, even if the doctrine was applied,

23

the efficient

proximate

cause of

the

loss of

the oil was an

excluded event, i.e., the corrosion of the tank.

Therefore, "the

efficient cause - the one that sets others in motion" was corrosion
of

the

tank

attributed".4

and

is

"the

cause

to

which

the

loss

is

to

be

Accordingly, the exclusionary clause applies even

though the loss occurred to property which was not itself corroded
or spoiled.
D.
THE UNDISPUTED FACTS SHOW THAT THE TANK CORRODED
EXCLUDING COVERAGE AS A MATTER OF LAW,
Having demonstrated that the exclusionary provision applies to
this loss, the only remaining issue is whether the claimed loss was
caused by corrosion.
demonstrates

that

The undisputed evidence before this Court
the

independent

expert

hired

by

CNA

to

investigate the matter found that the rust and corrosion caused
holes in the tank.

The oil escaped from the holes onto the ground.

This conclusions was also supported by the BLM investigation as
well as the information provided by Double-Tank.

See supra, pp. 8-

10.

4

Plaintiff's argument that the oil was lost because it spilled
onto the ground rather than as a result of the corrosion is the
same type of argument rejected by other courts.
The court in
Bettigole v. American Employers Ins. Co., 567 N.E. 2d. 1259 (Mass.
App. 1991) noted, "It will not escape notice that if the
plaintiff's view were adopted, the corrosion exclusion would tend
to disappear altogether because some similar agent of the process
could always be identified, n.5." Footnote 5, in relevant portion
reads/"the question of multiple and concurrent causes in property
damages insurance lends itself to logic chopping as well as
philosophic reflection. Bettigole, at 1276. (Citations omitted).
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E.

PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT AND CITED CASE LAW FAIL.

Plaintiff misses the point in focusing its argument on the
claim that there is a significant difference in this case between
whether

the

corrosion.

oil

was

lost

as

a direct

or

indirect

result

of

As noted above, the plain language of the policy does

not distinguish between direct and indirect losses.

The plain

language of the insuring clause of the policy covers losses to the
materials and equipment

listed.

itself to direct losses.

The exclusion does not limit

The plain language of the exclusion

simply and plainly states that losses caused by corrosion are
excluded under the policy.

Plaintiff does not dispute that the

loss of the oil was caused by corrosion.
p. 7.

See Plaintiff's Brief at

Instead, plaintiff evidently insists on focusing on whether

the loss of the oil was directly or indirectly related to the
corrosion.

Such an interpretation of the exclusionary language is

artificially forced and goes well beyond the plain language of the
policy.
In short, plaintiff's own subjective
policy

to

illustrates

include
that

for

the

words

plaintiff's

attempt

"directly"

and

interpretation

to read the
"indirectly"
to

prevail,

plaintiff must read into the policy more than the plain language
permits.

Accordingly, there is no ambiguity in the terms of the

contract and no presumptions or strict constructions are to be
applied in analyzing the policy language.
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Next, if this Court were to believe plaintiff's claim that the
unambiguous policy provisions do not cover loss of the oil from
corrosion or rust, and that "the oil was not rusted or corroded in
this case" (See plaintiff's Brief at page 16) this Court could just
as easily conclude that there is no coverage in this case because
the oil is not lost.
interpretation

of

In short, in applying plaintiff's strained

the policy,

this

Court

could

conclude

that

plaintiff's oil is not lost because plaintiff knows it is in the
ground around the tank and the policy does not cover removing it
from the ground.

Thus, plaintiff's suggestion that the policy was

intended only to cover rust or corrosion of oil which neither rusts
or corrodes (See Plaintiff's Brief at page 16, "crude oil is not
susceptible

to

rust

or

corrosion")

is

more

ludicrous

than

suggesting that there is no coverage in this case becamse the oil
cannot be lost when plaintiff knows where it is.

Further, by

admitting that oil neither rusts or corrodes (See plaintiff's Brief
at page

16) plaintiff

effectually

acknowledges

that

the

only

reasonable reading of the policy exclusion in this case is that
there will be no coverage if the oil is lost because of rust or
corrosion of the tank.

Otherwise, if applied only to the oil, the

policy exclusion would be meaningless.
In addition, the case of Pioneer Chlor Alkali Co. v. Royal
Indemnity Co. , 879 S.W. 2d 920 (Tex. App. 1994) cited by plaintiff
in support of its arguments is inapposite to the facts of this
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case, Pioneer dealt with a completely different type of policy and
dissimilar policy language.

In Pioneer, the policy in question was

a general "boiler and machinery" policy, and the key issue in the
case was whether damages caused by the release of tons of chlorine
into the atmosphere was an "accident" and thereby covered under the
policy language.
The policy in Pioneer provided that Royal Indemnity co. would
pay for "direct damage to covered property caused by a covered
cause of loss."

A "covered cause of loss" was defined by the

policy as "an accident to an object," and an "accident" was in turn
defined as "a sudden and accidental breakdown of the 'object' or
part of the 'object.' Id. at 925.
"depletion,

deterioration,

Further the policy stated that

corrosion

or

erosion"

was

not

an

"accident" under the meaning of the policy. Id.
In

its

argument,

Royal

evidently

argued

that

since

the

internal direct damage to the chlorine liquifier was caused by
corrosion and was not therefore an "accident" under the terms of
the policy, the resulting damages when the liquifier "suddenly and
accidentally" spewed 46 tons of chlorine into the atmosphere was
also not an "accident," and its denial of coverage was rightful.
Id. at 926.

To the contrary, Pioneer argued that the incident was

covered by the policy "because although erosion or corrosions [sic]
itself cannot be an accident under the Policy, an accident which
results from erosion or corrosions [sic] is a risk covered by the
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policy." Id.

The Court agreed with Pioneer, that while the policy

definition of "accident" excluded corrosion, it did not exclude a
sudden and accidental breakdown which might have been caused by
corrosion. Id. at 928.
Although the Texas Court of Appeals held in favor of the
plaintiff in Pioneer, the type of "boiler and machinery" policy in
Pioneer was not the type of policy in this case.

Indeed, there is

no

upon

language

in

CNA's

policy

plaintiff in Pioneer relied.

similar

to

that

which

the

Instead, the policy in this case does

not insure plaintiff against "loss or damage caused by vermin, wear
and

tear,

corrosion,

gradual
freezing,

deterioration
faulty

or

design

.

Undisputed Facts, fl 3 (emphasis added).

inherent
.

."

defect,

See

rust,

Statement

of

Thus, the policy in this

case specifically excludes damage caused by corrosion, where the
policy in Pioneer did not.

Moreover, the meaning of an "accident"

and what is considered an "accident" for the purpose of coverage in
the Pioneer policy does not reflect the language in this policy.
Finally, the Pioneer Court noted that in the cases it reviewed in
which

coverage

Employers

Ins.

was

denied,

Co.,

567

including

N.E.2d

1259

Bettigole
(Mass. App.

v.

American

Ct.

1991),

Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wasau Paper Mills, 818 F.2d
5 91 (7th Cir. 1986) and Adams-Arapahoe Joint Venture School Dist.
No. 28-J v. Continental Ins. Co., 891 F.2d 772 (10th Cir. 1989), the
policies in question contained express language excluding from
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coverage

loss

caused

by

corrosion.

Therefore,

the

court

in

Pioneer, implicitly acknowledges the validity of such exclusions.
Royal could have excluded the loss by merely expressly stating that
damages caused by corrosion were excluded (See Pioneer, 879 S.W.2d
at 929, 934, 935), as the policy at issue in this case expressly
states.
In summary, the focus in Pioneer was whether or not a loss or
damage caused by an "accident", which "accident" was in turn caused
by corrosion, was excluded.

In this case, S.W. Energy's policy

contains an exclusion for "loss or damage" caused by corrosion.
This causation language in the S.W. Energy policy was precisely the
language

"missing"

in Pioneer's

policy,

which

"accident caused by corrosion to be covered."
policy
"damage

contains
caused

causation
by

language

corrosion"

the

and

allowed

Since S.W. Energy's

unambiguously

analysis

for an

in

Pioneer

excludes
has

no

application and the trial court correctly granted Defendant summary
j udgment.
POINT II,
S.W. ENERGY'S BAD FAITH AND FRAUD CLAIMS PROPERLY FAILED
AS A MATTER OF LAW.
A.

BAD FAITH LAW.

In Utah, bad faith may be shown by demonstrating that the
insurer made an inadequate investigation and/or took a position
which was not fairly debatable.

See Billings v. Union Bankers Ins.
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Co. , 918 P. 2d 461 (Utah App. 1996) . It is axiomatic that where the
insurer's position is correct, the issue of bad faith is rendered
moot.

In this case, CNA's position was, at very least, fairly

debatable, entitling CNA to Summary Judgment as a matter of law on
that claim, even if there are other issues which preclude Summary
Judgment in favor of CNA on the merits.
1.

INVESTIGATION ISSUE.

Plaintiff

does

not

assert

in

its

brief

investigation was not timely, thorough or fair.

that

CNA's

However, even if

such a claim is raised it fails in light of the undisputed facts.
See supra, pp. 7-10.
decision

was

CNA made a prompt investigation, and when the

questioned

by

plaintiff's

counsel,

CNA

promptly

retained an independent expert to investigate the matter again.

In

Alf, the disposition of the coverage issue in favor of the insurer
also disposed of the bad faith claims as a matter of law.

See Alf

at 1272.
2.

FAIRLY DEBATABLE ISSUE,

Plaintiff apparently argues that CNA's interpretation of the
policy,

and

the

resulting

denial

of

coverage

was not

debatable" as that term has been defined by this Court.
essentially

asserts because

its own reading

of

"fairly

Plaintiff

the policy

is

plausible, any differing opinion would be neither plausible nor
fairly debatable.

Resolution of this argument goes hand-in-hand

with the issue of whether there was coverage in this case.
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As

analyzed above, because there was no coverage for the loss, CNA was
entitled

to

summary

judgment

as

a matter

of

law.

Further,

plaintiff has failed to establish how CNA should have been aware
that its analysis of the specific policy language was incorrect or
unreasonable.
Courts

In fact, the plain reading of the policy (as Utah

require)

favors

the

interpretation

CNA

reached.

See

generally, Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461 (Utah
1996) .
Moreover, even if on appeal this Court concludes that the
undisputed

facts do not

demonstrate

that

CNA was

entitled

to

summary judgment, it would necessarily follow that CNA's position
is fairly debatable or the trial court would not have found in
CNA's favor.

CNA does not propose a strained or hyper-technical

reading of the Policy in an effort to avoid coverage.
encourages a plain reading of the policy.

Instead, CNA

Plaintiff's proposed

construction of the policy, on the other hand, is the one which
requires assumption, inference and a construction contrary to plain
language and common sense.
B. PLAINTIFFS CITED AUTHORITY
FAITH IN THIS CASE.

DEFEATS CLAIMS OF BAD

Notwithstanding the fact that a reasonable investigation was
conducted and CNA assumed a reasonable position in regards to
coverage in this case, plaintiff's cited authority in Pioneer Chlor
Alkali Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co., 879 S.W. 2d 920 (Tex. App. 1994)
defeats plaintiff's claims of bad faith.
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In that case, the Texas

court

found

that

the

insurance

company's

position

was

fairly

debatable as a matter of law, even though the court found in favor
of the Plaintiff and against the insurer on the interpretation of
policy

1 anguage.

(See Id.) The Court

stated

that

despite

the

conflicting case law from other jurisdictions, the Defendant's
position with respect to the interpretation of its contract under
Texas law was reasonable:
Thus, even if we take Pioneer's position that Royal
knew about these out-of-state cases when it denied
coverage, it does not support Pioneer's claim that
Royal breached its duty of good faith and fair
dealing.
As long as Royal had some reasonable
basis to deny the claim there is no breach.
Evidence that merely shows a bona fide dispute
about the insurer's liability on the insurance
contract does not rise to the level of bad faith.
879 S.W.2d at 940.
And the Court reasoned: "Nor is bad faith established when a
trier of fact, using hindsight, decides the insurer was simply
wrong about the proper construction of the terms of the policy."
Id.
The fact that we have determined that
coverage exists is immaterial to the breach of
duty claim in this case. "The issue in bad
faith focuses not on whether the claim was
valid, but on the reasonableness of the
insurer's conduct in rejecting the claim."
879 S.W.2d at 940.
in that

case

The Pioneer court then ruled that the insurer

fulfilled

its duties by

conducting

a reasonable

investigation prior to denying coverage. The Court concluded, "The
record

shows

as

a

matter

of

law
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that

Royal

did

conduct

an

investigation and therefore, did not breach its duty of good faith
and fair dealing."

Pioneer at 941.

Consistent with the court's analysis in Pioneer,

this Court

should recognize that CNA undertook a reasonable investigation and,
when requested to by plaintiff's counsel, reopened the matter and
conducted a further investigation of the facts before finally and
timely denying coverage.

These undisputed facts, coupled with the

reasonable interpretation of the plain language of the policy and
Utah's contract construction principles, demonstrates that CNA did
not engage in bad faith as a matter of law.
authority

Plaintiff's cited

supported this finding and CNA was thus entitled to

summary judgment on the issue of bad faith and fraud.
CIF AN INSURER PREVAILS ON AN UNDERLYING CLAIM IT
CANNOT AS A MATTER OF LAW HAVE ACTED IN BAD FAITH IN ITS
RELATIONSHIP WITH A POLICYHOLDER,
Since CNA prevailed on the underlying claim as a matter of law
it could not have acted in bad faith in denying plaintiff's claim.
''Clearly Plaintiff could never show an absence of a reasonable
basis for denial of benefits if the insurer can prove that no
benefits were owed under the policy.

If the insurer prevails on

the breach of contract action, it could not, as a matter of law,
have acted in bad faith in its relationship with its policyholder."
Bartlett v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 538 A.2d 997, 1000
(Rhode Island 1988) .
valid claim.

The basis for a bad faith action must be a

Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 802 P.2d 1071,
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1073

(Arizona App. 1990) .

If the defendant insurer prevails on

liability, then the defendant's conduct necessarily cannot have
been in bad faith.

United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Millard, 847

SW.2d 668, 673 (Texas App. 1993).
In short, plaintiff's claims of bad faith and fraud are
ridiculous

when

the

trial

court

concluded

that

there

was

reasonable basis for CNA denying benefits as a matter of law.

a
By

prevailing on the underlying claim, CNA met the underlying standard
of a reasonable basis for denying benefits.

Further, even if this

Court were to reverse the trial court's ruling as to coverage under
the policy, plaintiff's bad faith and fraud claims must fail since
the issue of coverage was at least fairly debatable to cause the
trial court to conclude that the policy language did not cover the
claim.
POINT III,
THIS COURT SHOULD CONCLUDE THAT CNA'S MOTION TO STRIKE
WAS EFFECTIVELY GRANTED AND IMPROPER TESTIMONY BY
PLAINTIFFS WITNESSES WAS INADMISSABLE.
A.
RULE 56 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROHIBITED THE TRIAL COURT FROM CONSIDERING INADMISSABLE
FACTUAL STATEMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS WHICH WERE UNSUPPORTED
BY ADEQUATE FOUNDATION.
After

CNA

moved

for

summary

judgment

alleging

that

the

undisputed facts indicated that the rupture of the tank was due to
corrosion, plaintiff filed the supplemental affidavit of Richard P.
Smoot and the

"declaration" of Jim Pinneo setting
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forth their

opinions regarding the cause of the tank's failure.
In response, CNA moved to strike the supplemental affidavit
and declaration claiming that the opinions and conclusions stated
therein lacked foundation and were inadmissable under Utah law (See
R at 244, 245, 253, 257).
Rule

56

of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure

permits

affidavits to be filed in support of or in opposition to a motion
for summary judgment so long as the affidavits "set forth such
facts as would be admissible
attempting

to

avoid

summary

in evidence."
judgment

in

Nevertheless, in

this

case

plaintiff

presented the affidavit of Mr. Smoot which was essentially in the
form of an expert opinion.
requisite

foundation

However Mr. Smoot had not provided the

to support

his conclusions

regarding

the

causation aspects of the case.
In Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d 1130 (Utah App. 1990) the Utah Court
of Appeals ruled that Rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence allows
an expert to state his opinion concerning the ultimate issue in the
case, but requires the expert provide a sufficient factual basis
for

the

opinions

he

proffers.

Nowhere

in

the

supplemental

affidavit does Mr. Richard Smoot effectively provide sufficient
foundation for his conclusions regarding the cause of the tank's
failure.

As a result, his opinions should be deemed speculative,

conclusory, and not admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Further, Mr. Smoot failed to demonstrate that he had the requisite
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expertise to testify regarding metallurgy or failure analysis of
metals,

drums

or

other

surfaces

at

issue

in

this

case.

Specifically, paragraphs 17, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 28 of Mr.
Smoot's affidavit lacked adequate expert foundation.

In short,

Smoot's opinions regarding the cause of the failure of the tank in
this case were inadmissible. (See R at 207-217)
The declaration of Mr. Pinneo was no more helpful to plaintiff
than the affidavit of Mr. Smoot.
offer

sufficient

conclusion

he

basis

or

reaches

Indeed, Mr. Pinneo failed to

foundation

regarding

which

the

would

tank's

support

failure.

the
His

conclusions were also without sufficient foundation and therefore
inadmissible to oppose Defendant's motion for summary judgment (See
R at 218-220).
Other courts have essentially held that where a movant's
underlying motion for summary judgment is granted, a motion to
strike is considered moot. See generally Badoni v. Higginson, 455
F.Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977).
Although

the

trial

court

did

not

rule

on

the

issue,

effectively then, this Court should conclude that the supplemental
affidavit and declaration offered by plaintiff were effectively and
properly stricken in that there were no admissible facts to dispute
those CNA presented demonstrating that the failure of the tank was
caused by corrosion.
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B. EVEN IF THE COURT FINDS SUFFICIENT FOUNDATION FOR THE
AFFIDAVITS OR STATEMENTS THAT WERE THE SUBJECT OF THE
MOTION TO STRIKE, THEIR EFFECT IS MOOT IN THAT PLAINTIFF
HAS NOW ADMITTED THAT THE CAUSE OF THE TANK'S FAILURE WAS
CORROSION.
Even if this Court finds that the affidavits or statements of
Richard P. Smoot and Jim Pinneo had sufficient foundation to avoid
CNA's motion

to strike, the testimony

in those

statements

is

essentially moot as plaintiff has now admitted that "the direct
damage

to

the

tank

was

plaintiff's Brief at p. 7.

caused

by

rust

or

corrosion."

See

Thus, the substance of the affidavits

or statements in question is moot and of no consequence, and the
trial court's order striking the same is harmless error.
C. IF THE AFFIDAVITS WERE IMPROPERLY STRICKEN, ALLOWING
THE SAME WOULD MERELY CAUSE PLAINTIFFS CLAIM TO BE
DENIED UNDER THE "WEAR AND TEAR" EXCLUSION,
Assuming arguendo that the trial court improperly struck the
declaration of Jim Pinneo and the affidavit of Richard P. Smoot,
the trial court's order constitutes harmless error or brings CNA's
denial of coverage under the wear and tear policy exclusion, making
summary judgment proper nonetheless.
Similar to the "corrosion exclusion", thepolicy excludes all
damages caused by "wear and tear, gradual deterioration or inherent
defect."

(R at 138).

Under Richard Smoot's definition of the

events,
after the weld broke loose, the vibration of
the recirculating system apparently caused the
now-loosened leg to rub against the floor of
37

the tank, wearing away much of the leg and
simultaneously wearing a hole in the steel
plate or the tank floor, until the leg finally
punched through the remaining layer of thing
SU66x

••••

R. at 210-211 (emphasis added).
Thus, even if the trial court improperly struck Mr. Smoot's
affidavit, Mr. Smoot's affidavit establishes sufficient reason for
denial of coverage under the
policy,

necessitating

"wear and tear" exclusion in the

summary

judgment

on behalf

of

CNA,

and

court

that

the

resulting in harmless error.
CONCLUSION
CNA

properly

demonstrated

to

the

trial

undisputed facts entitled it to summary judgment since the plain
language of the policy at issue excludes loss of Plaintiff's oil
caused by corrosion due to the tank holding

it.

Plaintiff's

efforts to strain and contort the plain policy language to create
an ambiguity failed below and do not merit a reversal of this case.
In addition, the undisputed facts demonstrate at the very
least that CNA's position in this matter was fairly debatable, if
not actually correct.
fraud

likewise

Thus, plaintiff's claim for bad faith and

properly

failed.

Finally,

the

affidavit

and

statement plaintiff filed to try to avoid summary judgment lacked
sufficient foundation to be admissible.

Accordingly, CNA was

entitled to summary judgment and this Court should sustain the
trial court's ruling in that regard on appeal.
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RESPECTFULLY submitted this 3 / ^

day of July, 1998.

HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE

SCOTT W. CHRISTENSEN
JARYL L. RENCHER
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, this ,S/^-—day of July, 1998, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing to the following:
Robert P. Hill, Esq.
John A. Adams, Esq.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
79 South Main Street, Ste. 400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake* City, UT 84145-0385
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ADDENDUM
A. MOAC Oil and Gas Lease Property Form. R. 157-158.
B. ACORD Property Loss Notice, December 14, 1995.

R. 159.

C. Swett Sc Crawford Group, Notice of Claim, November 27, 1995. R.
160.
D. Adjuster Contact Record, December 15, 1995, through June 5,
1996. R. at 161-168.
E. Double Tank estimate of costs insuring tank, CNA Insurance
Companies correspondence regarding uninsurable event. R.
169-178.
F. BLM Incident report to CNA. R. 179-182.
G. CNA Declination of Claim, February 8, 1996. R. 183.
H. Correspondence from S.W. Energy Corp's Counsel to CNA, April
10, 1996. R. 184-188.
I. Report of Garrett Engineers, June 5, 1996. R. 189-200.
J. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, Judge William
A. Thorne, Civil No. 960905357, October 1, 1997. R. 266-269.

Tab A

JVKSC
OIL AND GAS LEASE PROPERTY FORM
L This policy mtucbes for %J ^'• i J ' ' on property consisting of tanks, pumps, machinery, pipe, and
aD other similar equipment and/or persona] property of a mobile or floating nature, including all
crude petroleum in tanks, usual to the operation of a producing Ofl or Gas Well, while situated at
producing well-sites anywhere within the United States including while in transit as often as may
be required during the currency of this policy.
2. PROPERTY EXCLUDED:
A. Real property and/or structures except temporary sheds, engine booses or belt houses;
B. Brick, stone or concrete foundations or machinery or equipment, below ground level;
C Underground piping and contents, fittings, conduits, drains and floes;
D. Aircraft;
E. Motor vehicles and/or trailers licensed for use on public highways;
F. Water borne vessels and their contents;
C. Railway or railroad rolling stock and contents (except contents on above described premises coo*
signed to or to be shipped by the Insured while not under control of public carrier);
H. All property located off shore or beyond shore line;
I. Pull rods (and supports) from powerhouse to wells;
J. Gasoline or gas recycling plants;
K. Refineries;
L. Drilling derricks, drilling tools and drilling rigs;
M. Oil tanks of ten thousand (10,000) barrels or over capacity and their contents;
N. Earthen or concrete flow or storage pits or reservoirs and their contents;
O. Derricks, unless specifically endorsed hereon.
3. ACQUISITION CLAUSE
In consideration of the agreement by the Insured to report additional property on leases insured
hereunder or on leases acquired subsequent to attachment date of this poDcy, within sixty days from
the date such additional property values of the same general type as insured hereunder, are acquired,
and to pay full premium thereon from the date acquired at pro rata of the effective rates, this policy
covers such additionally acquired property for an amount not to exceed ten percent (10%) of the
limit of liability of this policy or $20,000., whichever is greater. This policy shall cease to cover
such additionally acquired property if it is not reported to the Company within said sixty-day (60):
period.
It is further understood and agreed that in the event any owners of interests in said additionally acquired property have been excluded from coverage under lease equipment values already a part of
this policy, then and In that event, the same interest owners are sunQariy excluded from coverage m
any additionally acquired property unless, within ten days from the date said additional property is
acquired, this Company is notified that said interest owners desire protection to the extent of their interests in said additionally acquired property lo be insured and that additional premium computed as
stated above, will be paid to this Company.
4. THIS POLICY INSURES AGAINST:
All risks of direct physical loss of or damage to the property covered except as hereinafter provided.
5. THIS POLICY DOES NOT INSURE AGAINST:
A. Loss or damage caused by vermin, wear and tear, gradual deterioration or inherent defect, rust,
corrosion, freezing, faulty design, mechanical breakdown, and faulty workmanship or materials
in the course of any renovating, refinishing or repairing process, delay or loss of use.
B. Loss or damage or expense, if at the time thereof, there is any other insurance which would attach if this insurance had not been effected, e*c*pt.that this teunsacs shall apply only as excess and in no event as contributing insurance and then only after aS other insurance has been
exhausted.
C Loss or damage due to short-circuiting, blow-out, or other electrical disturbances within any
electrical apparatus, appliance or device insured hereunder unless fire ensues and then for loss
or damage caused by such ensuing fire only.
D. Loss or damage caused by the infidelity of the Insured's employees or persons to whom the property described herein is entrusted.
E. Loss or damage caused by blow-out unless fire ensues, and then only for l o u or damage directly
caused by such ensuing fire.
F. Notwithstanding anything herein contained to the contrary, this insurance is warranted free from
loss or damage caused by or resulting from: (1) Hostile or warlike action in time of peace or war,
including action in hindering, combating or defending against an actual, impending or expected
attack (a) by any government or sovereign power (de jure or de facto), or by any authority maintaining or using military, naval or air forces; or (b) by military, naval or air forces; or (c) by an
agent of any such government, power, authority or forces; (2) Any weapon employing atomic fission

131

or radioactive forces whether in time of peace or war, (3) Insurrection, rebellion, revolution, civil
war. unsurped power, or action taken by governmental authority in hindering, combating or defending against such an occurrence, seizure or destruction under quarantine or customs regulations, confiscation by order of any government or public authority, or risks of contraband or i l legal transportation or trade.
G. Loss by nuclear reaction or nuclear radiation or radioactive contamination, all whether controlled
or uncontrolled, proximate or remote, or be in whole or in part caused by, contributed to, or aggravated by the peril(s) insured against in this policy; however, subject to the foregoing and a t
provisions of this policy, direct loss by fire resulting from nuclear reaction or nuclear radiation or
radioactive contamination not emanating from any weapon of war is insured against by this policy.

SPECIAL CONDITIONS
*. DEDUCTIBLE CLAUSE
Each daim for loss or damage (separately occurring) shall be adjusted separately and from the
amouQT of each such adjusted daim or the applicable limit of liability, whichever is less, the sum
of. $
shall be deducted
7. * 0 % . COINSURANCE CLAUSE
"This Company shall be liable in the event of loss for no greater proportion thereof than the amount
hereby insured bears to 90% of the actual cash value of the property insured hereunder at the time
suchJoss-shall happen,
BASIS OF SETTLEMENT CLAUSE:
Unless otherwise provided, this Company shall not be liable beyond the actual cash value of the property at m time any loss or damage occurs and the loss or damage shall be ascertained or estimated
according to such actual cash value with proper deduction for depreciation, however caused, and
shall in no event exceed what it would then cost to repair or replace the same with material of like
kind and quality.
In the event of claim for loss to crude petroleum, the basis of settlement shall be the posted market
price thereof on the date of the loss, plus the gathering and transportation charges, phis premium
value actually paid by Insured but in no case to exceed replacement value of like kind and quality
at the time and place of loss.
f. WAIVER OF INVENTORY OR APPRAISEMENT CLAUSE:
If this policy shall be subject to the conditions of the coinsurance clause, it is also made a condition
that in the adjustment of any loss hereunder, provided same does not exceed 2% of the total insurance carried, it shall not be a part of compliance with the conditions of a Coinsurance Clause to inventory or appraise the undamaged property.
10. FOAM LOSS ASSUMPTION CLAUSE:
A. In consideration of the rate of premium at which this policy is written mis Company shall be
liable for the loss to foam solution or other fire extinguishing materials lost, expended, or destroyed in fighting fire involving property insured hereunder to the extent only of the value of
such extinguishing materials which are on the premises, or on adjacent premises if such matrriah
are jointly owned at the time the fire originates, but this Company shall not be Sable for loss to
similiar materials which may be brought upon the premises for the purpose of extinguishing a
fin already in progress at the time such materials are ordered and delivered.
B. If there shall be any other insurance on the property insured hereunder this Company shall
only be liable pro rata with such other insurance whether such other insurance be against Ion
covered hereunder or not and this Company shall only be liable pro rata with all insurance
covering in any manner the hazards or loss insured against by this policy; anything in this policy
to the contrary notwithstanding.
1 L LOSS CLAUSE:
Any loss hereunder shall not reduce the amount of this policy.
12. SUBROGATION WAIVER CLAUSE:
Thb insurance shaO not be invalidated if the Insured in writing has waived or may hereafter, but
prior to the occurrence of any loss covered hereunder, waive its right of recovery from any firm, corporation or individual, for loss coverage hereunder and this Company expressly waives subrogation
against any subsidiary or affiliate Company of the Insured.

Attached to and forming part of Policy No.
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MOAC
PO Box 17980
Denver, CO 80217

,r

4-

¥\
Swett&Crauufbrd Group

/

NOTICE OF CLAIM
ASSURED:

S.W. Energy

^
«&
CERTIFICATE/POLICY: IMC488415

DATE OF ACCIDENT:

11-27-95

CLAIMANT:

Insured

LOCATION:

Grand County, Utah

BRIEF FACTS:

Bottom of tank exploded, 495 barrells of oil lost
due to bottom of tank exploded on site of oil field.

^

<J>*

DAMAGE EST./SUITE AMT.:

Unknown

ADJUSTER:

Please Advise

COMMENTS:

Teresa Wooldridge

CLaims Dept
12-14-95

[icO

TabD

Adjuster Contact
Completed:

12-15-95

Insured:
Ref. No:
Claimant:

S.W. Energy Inc.
N/A
S.W. Energy Inc.

Claim Symbol:
Date of Loss:
Policy Number:
Party Contacted:
Contact Method:
Subject:

Diaries Issued: 12-15-95

INRL
11-27-95
IM 00488415
Insured
Phone

Claim Number:
Date Reported:
Policy Period:

540-6-C3029
Sfx: 0
12-15-95
10-27-95 to 10-27-96

If Other, Please Specify:

Explosion

Comment:
INSURED OIL & GAS LEASE PROPERTY POLICY COVERS CRUDE PETROL IN TANKS
WITH EXCLUSIONS FOR WEAR & TEAR, GRADUAL DETERIORATION, RUST, CORROSION AND SO ON. I
ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT INSURED TWICE, BUT TO NO AVAIL. IN THE INTERIM, I WILL ASSIGN FRED
HARLOW ( CNA HEAVY EQUIPMENT - 312 822 6423 ) TO THIS MATTER.

ILI

Adjuster Follow Up
Completed:

12-21-95

Insured:
Ref. No:
Claimant:

S.W. Energy Inc.
N/A
S.W. Energy Inc.

Claim Symbol:
Date of Loss:
Policy Number:
Subject:

Diaries Issued: 12-21-95

INRL
11-27-95
IM 00488415

Claim Number:
Date Reported:
Policy Period:

540-6-C3029
Sfx: 0
12-15-95
10-27-95 to 10-27-96

Cna Assignment

Comment:
JOE FERA ( CNA HEAVY EQUIP - 805 272 8938) WAS ASSIGNED TO THIS MATTER BY
FRED HARLOW. REQUESTED JOE GO TO LOSS SITE PERSONALLY, TO ASCERTAIN SCOPE OF LOSS
AND TO SOLIDFY A POSSIBLE DECLINATION.

IITL

Adjuster Folio w-Up - 90

Diaries Issued: 01-15-96

Completed:

01-15-96

Insured:
Ref. No:
Claimant:

S.W. Energy Inc.
N/A
S.W. Energy Inc.

Claim Symbol:
Date of Loss:
Policy Number:
Subject:

lys

INRL
11-27-95
IM 00488415

Claim Number:
Date Reported:
Policy Period:

540-6-C3029
Sfx: 0
12-15-95
10-27-95 to 10-27-96

Insured Discussion

Comment:
SPOKE WITH INSURED, WHO DID NOT RECEIVE MY PREVIOUS MESSAGE, ADVISED
TANK DID NOT EXPLODE BUT OIL LEAKED OUT OF A HOLE(S) IN THE BOTTOM OF THE TANK. I HAVE
ASSIGNED JOE FAROS ( CNA HEAVY EQUIPMENT - 805 272 8938) TO THIS MATTER. PRELIMINARY
INFO INDICATES WEAR & TEAR AND / OR GRADUAL DETERIORATION OF THE TANK CAUSED THE
SEEPAGE. THERE IS A POLICY EXCLUSION FOR THIS. UNTIL JOE REACHES THE LOSS SITE, IT MAY BE
PREMATURE FOR A RES OF RIGHTS.

\i*i

Adjuster Foliow-Up - 90
Completed:

01-15-96

Insured:
Ret. No:
Claimant:

S.W. Energy Inc.
N/A
S.W. Energy Inc.

Claim Symbol:
Date of Loss:
Policy Number:
Subject:

iys
Diaries Issued: 01-15-96

INRL
11 -27-95
IM 00488415

Claim Number:
Date Reported:
Policy Period:

540-6-C3029
Six: 0
12-15-95
10-27-95 to 10-27-96

Cna Discussion

Comment:
SPOKE WITH JOE, WHO CONFIRMED, VIA INSPECTION AND DISCUSSIONS WITH SITE
MANAGER, THE SEEPAGE WAS DUE TO THE DETERIORATION OF THE TANK. HIS REPORT, AS WELL
AS THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT ( BLM ) REPORT ARE AWAITED, BEFORE ISSUANCE OF THE
DECLINATION. I WILL FORWARD A RES OF RIGHTS IN THE INTERIM.

|(,M

Adjuster Follow-Up - 90
Completed:

02-08-96

Insured:
Ref. No:
Claimant:

S.W. Energy Inc.
N/A
S.W. Energy Inc.

Claim Symbol:
Date of Loss:
Policy Number:
Subject:

iys
Diaries Issued: 02-08-96

INRL
11 -27-95
IM 00488415

Claim Number:
Date Reported:
Policy Period:

540-6-C3029
Sfx: 0
12-15-95
10-27-95 to 10-27-96

B L M Report

Comment:
SPOKE WITH JOE FARO, WHO HAS REC'D THE BUREAU OF LAND MGT. REPORT, WHICH
CONFIRMS TANK FAILURE WAS DUE TO THE WEAR & TEAR UPON THE TANK. BLM STATES, PER HIS
INSPECTION OF THE TANK," THE CAUSE OF EVENT ... BOTTOM OF TANK HAD FLAW AND RUPTURED,
CAUSED BY WEIGHT OF OIL & SUDDEN CHANGE OF TEMPERATURE ON WATER CONTENT."
REPAIRER STATES ( WILL LOVATO AT DOUBLE TANK CORP.) PER HIS INSPECTION," THE APPARENT
CAUSE OF LOSS IS AGE AND WEAR AND TEAR." THERE IS A POLICY EXCLUSION FOR LOSS OR
DAMAGE CAUSED BY ... WEAR AND TEAR ... CORROSION ... GRADUAL DETERIORATION .... BASED
UPON ABOVE, DECLINATION OF CLAIM WILL BE SOUGHT.

IW

Adjuster Foliow-Up - 90
Completed:

04-17-96

Insured:
Ref. No:
Claimant:

S.W. Energy Inc.
N/A
S.W. Energy Inc.

Claim Symbol:
Date of Loss:
Policy Number:
Subject:

*ys
Diaries Issued: 04-17-96

INRL
11 -27-95
IM 00488415

Claim Number:
Date Reported:
Policy Period:

540-6-C3029
Sfx: 0
12-15-95
10-27-95 to 10-27-96

Refuter

Comment:
Rec'd letter from ins'd atty disputing validity of claim declination and demanding full payment for
loss of oil. Instructed Joe Ferro at CNA - Ontario, my onsite adjuster, to query as to whether the tank was
available for inspection and if so, have a tank expert or metallurgist inspect the tank ASAP and advise as to the
cause of failure.

iu

Adjuster Folio w-Up - 90
Completed:

05-03-96

Insured:
Ref. No:
Claimant:

S.W. Energy Inc.
N/A
S.W. Energy Inc.

Claim Symbol:
Date of Loss:
Policy Number:

iys
Diaries Issued: 05-03-96

INRL
11 -27-95
IM 00488415

Claim Number:
Date Reported:
Policy Period:

540-6-C3029
Sfx: 0
12-15-95
10-27-95 to 10-27-96

Subject:

Inspection

Comment:

Tank inspection is set for (May 5, 1996) w/ ins'd and our rep (Mike Phillips - 310 537 3647)

l(TJ

Adjuster Follow-Up - 9G
Completed:

06-05-96

Insured:
Ref. No:
Claimant:

S.W. Energy Inc.
N/A
S.W. Energy Inc.

Claim Symbol:
Date of Loss:
Policy Number:
Subject:

lys
Diaries Issued: 06-05-96

INRL
11-27-95
IM 00488415

Claim Number:
Date Reported:
Policy Period:

540-6-C3029
Sfx: 0
12-15-95
10-27-95 to 10-27-96

Engineer Analysis

Comment:
Enginer concludes that," along side of welded connection that was completely rusted away was
a hole approximately 2 " wide ... This was the source of the oil spill. The 2 " hole hads rusted from the outside ...
because of a common error made during field fabrications." The analysis confirms the validity of the previously
forwarded declination and will serve as a basis for the reiteration of the declination.

iwr

TabE

Feb-08-96 05:31P

JOE F F R R O

805-272-8938

CNA INSURANCE COMPANIES
Heavy Equipment UnitP.O.Box 901540 Palmdale.Caltfomia 93590

February 8.1996
Marine Office of America Corporation
William Patter
5690 DTC Boulevard
Englewood.Cotorado 60111
Claim # 540 6C 3029
Insured: S.W. Energy
LOSS Date: 11-27-1995
Report Number
Final
Enclosures
1)Repair quote
2)Land Management Report
3)Photographs
4)Recorded statement summary
Reserve
Set prior to receipt of this toss.
Assignment
This assignment to inspect verify if covered loss.determine capacity and evaluate damages to
tank was received on 12-18-1995.
Insurance
Coverage for thistossprovided by Continental Insurance policy #00466415 under the Oil and
Gas Lease Property Formtor$36.500.00.with a $1,000 00 deductMeEffectrve date 10-27-95
to10-27-96.

P

F e b - O e - 9 6 0 5 : 3 1 P JOE

FFRRO

805-272-8938

Insured
S.W. Energy at 847 E 400 South. Salt Lake City,Utah 84102.Richard Smoct 801-532-6664.

Risk
A 500 barrel oil tank buitt by American Tank Steal Corporation in March of 1063 with serial t
2577 Basic dimensions; I S * " Diameter 16* high Cone bottom design 1/4' steel bottom deck
and shell.

Coinsurance
Review of file does not reflect a coinsurance requirement

Loss and Damage
It appears bottom of this tank floor developed a leek,spilting its content of approximately 454
barrels of oil. This was due to condition.age and type of content

Recommendations
Based on the information provided by thereportfrom Utah State Land Management and the
repair facility Double Tank Corporation. Werecommendconsidering denial of this daim, since
this spill was due to failure of the tank floor.

Closing
This will conclude our activity on this file.lf any questions or concems.please contact me at
your covenience.

Joe Ferro
Heavy Equipment Specialist
(805) 272-8938

P.
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CORP.
P.O.Box 2646
303 North Highway 644
BloomfteUt, New Mexico 87413-2646

EIN 86-0407821
Voice (806)632-0611
F « (506)632-0037

January 11, 1996
Joe Ferro
CNA Insurance
Via Facsimile (805) 272-8938
Re: Refurbishing 500bbl Tank
Vicinity of Green River, Utah
S.W. Energy
Dear Mr. Ferro:
Pursuant to your requestr Double Tank makes the following proposal
for reconditioning a 500bbl belonging to S.W, Energy$ located on
the Smoot Federal Lease near Green Riverf Utah:
Cut and remove existing bottom from tank, replace with 1/4n
steel flat bottom, replace load coupling and drain coupling
with API 4* fittings, replace inspection door and door plate.
Pressure test for leaks, coat bottom with coal tar epoxy.
Work done on location. Approximate volume of resulting tank,
440bbl.
Price, including crew expenses and crane truck, $3,012.50.
Please do not hesitate to call me should you have any questions.
Double Tank Corporation

u

will iovato
President

Subject:

Report u^/tfldesirable Event J

Date of Occurrence:

j2

Date Reoorted to BOi:

/'/¥?/95

Location: State: rrmH
k£

1/4 fl Z

Operator:

Time of Occurrence: Ej.^ frf>\ - li-nTine Reported to BLM: r.-95Q '

County: C JM-TULJJ j UT

1/4 Section

5
__ / ^

"1 T. -2.3S

R.

!"}£, x/*tf?Meridian

^fMi^j
^____^-,

Surface Ownership:\FEDERAL^jINDIAN,
Lease Number:
type of Event:

,

PEE, STATE
7 Dhit Name of C A , Ntnnber

BLOWDOT, PIPE, FATALITY, INJURY, PPOPERIY DAMAGE,/OIL SPILL,"
SALTWATER SPILL, TDXIC FLUID SPILL, OIL AND SALTWATER SPILL,
OIL AND TOXIC FLUID SPILL, SALTWATER AND TOXIC FLUID SPILL,
GAS VENTING, OR OTHER (Specify)
_________________

Cause of Event: Lrt<*

*£ r.iL TAK'K ti*£ FLth* ^JS #I^*~LS

Volumes of Pollutants

O^±£

I . discharged or consumed:
II.

Recovered:

Time Required to Control Event (in hours):

-4*—
$ l4lTb

Action Taken to Control the Event, Description of Resultant Damage,
Clean-up Procedures, and Dates:

^ y a*rfjL~

^^/J/ICLI

Jxm£Ar*iW

5f„rfrl

—

^Sf/x/df*-CJ&-cL~t/

aJtJ! TAU^^ ^JJ^ fa.u< j-^J^

Cause and Extent of Personnel Injury:

A/jV-4^,,

Other Federal, State, and Local Governmental Aqencies Notified:
^/wAti^i^v^^

Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence: fo J^/^r { ^v

h^zO

7udk*~'

General Remarks:

<^/u*~ \ Xj*L
Signature:

Title:

JWT^V

4 * „ Jfi

^

sWww*^

u r.C, U

^:J

U~ UiouJ a.
Date:

95///A?

•.

1f/'V*?Z
f

ft//*//y

TabF

CNA INSURANCE COMPANIES
Heavy equipment Unit,P O Box 901540 Palrmiale. California 93590

Date 1-12-96

Status Report

Marine Office of America Corporation
Bill Parker
5690 DTC Boulevard
EngJewood,Colorado 80111
Claim # 54O6C3029
InsuredsW. Energy
Loss Date: 11-27-95
—Awaiting insured response
—Awaiting repair invoice
—Awaiting repair estimate
—Awaiting teardown of unit

—Awaiting policy records
—Awaiting additional bills
—Awaiting response to settlement
—made on

OtherAwaitino requested report from Utah State Department of Land Management
Comment: It appears tank floor weak due to age and composition of content Spoke with
repair facility.wil! forward quote for refurbishing floor as needed.
Upon receipt and further review of report,will advise on determination and course of
action.
If any questions or concerns, please contact this writer.

JoeFerro
Heavy Equipment Specialist
(805) 272-8938

CNA INSURANCE COMPANIES
Heavy Equipment Unit, P.O. Box 901540 Palmdale,California 93590

February 6, 1996

Marine Office of America Corporation
William Parker
5690 DTC Boulevard
Englewood, Colorado 80111
Claim # 540 6C 3029
Insured: S.W. Energy
Loss Date: 11-27-95

Statement Summary
As per Mr Will Lovato,at Double Tank Corporation,the floor of the 500 bbl tank with serial #
2577 involved in this loss,was rotted,pitted and had a hole on the bottom toward the middle.
The apparent cause is age and wear and tear.A quote was prepared to refurbish floor.
Comment
Statement was secured from Mr Lovato,president of Double Tank Corporation.Mr Lovato
inspected this tank prior to our arrival as requested by our insured.

l«o

b - 0 7 - 9 6 0 3 : 3 1 P JOE

FERRO

8GS-272-8938

CNA INSURANCE COMPANIES
Heavy Equipment UnitP.O. Box 901540 Palmdale, California 93590

Facsimile Cover Sheet

To: Bill Parker
Company: MOAC
Fax: 303-290-7349
From: Joe Ferro
Phone: 805-272-8938
Fax:

805-272-8938

Date: 2-7-96
Pages including cover2

Comments: COPY of report from Utah Land manaoement re: oil tank failure.

Feb-07-96

0^:32P

Subject:
Date

of

J O E FERRO

Occurrence: /7 Ixnhf

Location:

P.02

Report o v W e s i r a b l e Event J

Oat* Raoorted to BLM:

1:6

805-272-8938

state:

1/4 5 cT

^T

Time of occurrence: £.r<U, frrt - //-»• >•

('klfot

"TAB

TJae^Reported to BLM: ^ ? r ' o
County: CJ^x^A

1/T

1/4 Section . ' 7 T. . 2 3~* , R. H £ , ____?Meridian

Operator: ,
Surface Ownership:\FETCRALr)INDIAN, FEE, S*ME
Lea^e Number:
Type Of Event:

'L{TUVbObo£

: Ohit ***» of C.A. »a«her

BLOWOUT, PIPE, FATALITY, LttfOHY, PROPERTY DAMAGE./on, SPJLL^
SALTWATER SPILL, TOXIC FLUlP SPTLL, OIL AND SALIWTER SPILL,
OIL AND TOXIC FLUID SPILL, ^LTHATER AW TOXIC FLUID SPILL.
GAS VENTING, OR OTHER (Specify) ________________________

Cau^e of Event: Lffrr"

fi£

r.iL T/K-K l{f£ Ft** *id

fiufi*~U

c ^^±C

fy f,/H -J.c^ <l ^MIL. r.L, y J ^ . . ^ p c t l ^ ^ ^ ,^r7^ r.^fe,^
'VoltKKS, o l ?oV_ft_nta

I . ^Vat'nargeA ox
II.

&****&,

4 £4- fifiLS

Recovered:

Tijn« Required t o Control Event (in hours):

a l4u?*^ra~

Action Taken to Control the Event, Description of Resultant Damage,
Cle*n-up Procedures, and Dates:

l^/i/lll

Skftl

—

RS/JX/dC-CJ&-CL~*S

Cau$e and Extent of Personnel Iniury:

Other Pederal, State, and Local Governmental Agencies Notified:

General Remarks:

+ rs-//2// y

n.
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Marine Oh.~e of America Corporation
P.O. Box 17980
Denver, CO 80217-0980
(800) NSC - 2320
Fax: (800) NSC - 2393

^FTContinental
Insurance.
%

February 8, 1996
S.W. Energy Inc.
847 E. 400 South
Salt Lake City UT 84102
Attn: Rich Smoot
RE:

Insured:
Date of Loss:
Our Claim No.:
Our Policy No.:
Your File No.:
Subject:

S.W. Energy Inc.
11-27-95
540-6-C3029
IM 00488415
N/A
Declination Of Claim

Dear Rich Smoot:
We have investigated the above captioned oil tank seepage matter and regret to advise, that we will be
unable to respond favorably to this matter.
As you are aware, your Oil and Gas Lease Property Form policy proffers all risk coverage for your tanks,
subject to various policy exclusions. Please review Section 5. This Policy Does Not Insure Against,
subsection A., which stipulates
" Loss or damage caused by ... wear and tear, gradual deterioration, corrosion ..."
The repairer ( Double Tank Corporation) states in his report," The apparent cause is age and wear and
tear."
Due to the preceding, we must decline coverage for this matter in its totality.
The foregoing declination of liability is not intended to be all inclusive and all other rights and defenses
under the policy and / or law are hereby reserved to the company without specific enumeration.
Should you have any further information that you believe will have any bearing on your claim, please
contact me promptly so that we may discuss it further.
Sincerely,
William H. Parker
Senior Claims Representative

\v>

TabH

KAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

RECEIVE-

PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
4 0 0 Deseret Building
7 9 South Main Street
P.O. Box 4 5 3 8 5
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4 1 4 5 - 0 3 8 5
Facsimile: ( 8 0 1 ) 5 3 2 - 7 5 4 3
Telephone: ( 8 0 1 ) 5 3 2 - 1 5 0 0
Robert P. Hill

APR
W « H * P
kOQ
HTTl

4 *
' J

#

I 5 i^1NSC

|OA/
, 7 7 0

Direct Line: (801) 3 2 3 - 3 3 3 4

April 10, 1996

Certified Mail - Return Receipt Requested
CONTINENTAL INSURANCE
MARINE OFFICE OF AMERICA CORPORATION
P.O. Box 17980
Denver Colorado 80217-0980
Attn: Mr. William H. Parker
Senior Claims Representative
Re:

S. W. Energy Corporation
Policy No. IM 00488415
Claim No. 540-6-C3029

Gentlemen:
We are writing on behalf of S. W. Energy Corporation, the
insured under your policy No. IM 00488415 regarding a loss which
occurred November 26, 1995. We have reviewed the underlying
policy, your letter of February 8, 1996 addressed to Mr. Richard
P. Smoot, President of S. W. Energy, and your facsimile letter of
March 6, 1996 to Mr. Ken Osborne, your local broker, declining
coverage. We have also made further investigation of the loss.
Based on the foregoing, it has become clear that your initial
denial of coverage is based on misunderstandings of the underlying facts and on a misinterpretation of policy provisions under
Utah law. We are writing to facilitate resolution of these
misunderstandings and to expedite payment of the claim in order
to avoid the need for further wasteful proceedings on the part of
both parties.
The underlying policy is a basic oil and gas lease property
form, which covers both equipment and crude oil inventory at oil
and gas wells operated by S. W. Energy Corporation in Grand
County, Utah.
The loss occurred on November 26, 1995 when a crude oil
storage tank unexpectedly failed. The tank was full at the time,

m

Continental Insurance
April 10, 1996
Page 2
holding 495-15 barrels of oil, all of which was dumped from the
tank in a period of less than 90 minutes. The posted price for
crude oil on the date of loss was $19.00 per barrel, for a total
loss of $9,407.85 (less any applicable deductible). The accident
was immediately reported to and investigated by the Bureau of
Land Management, the lessor under the applicable oil and gas
lease and owner of the land impacted by the lost crude oil. I
have enclosed for your information a copy of the final report
filed with and accepted by the B.L.M. which describes the accident.
Following the failure of the tank, S. W. Energy determined
that it would be more cost-effective to replace the failed tank
with two smaller tanks than to repair it. The new tanks were
ordered from CR Supply Company of Grand Junction Colorado. CR
Supply, in turn, forwarded the order to Double Tank Corporation
in Farmington, New Mexico, a distributor of new tanks.
Double Tank delivered the new tanks in December, 1996. At
the time the new tanks were delivered, Double Tank used its
equipment to move the failed tank to a storage area and set up
the new tanks.
S. W. Energy has filed a claim under its oil and gas property policy for the loss of the crude oil. It has made no claim
for damage to or replacement of the failed tank.
Your correspondence denying the claim reflects either a
misunderstanding or a mischaracterization of the pertinent facts,
policy provisions and claim. In your letter of February 8, you
characterize the loss as "oil tank seepage," and decline "coverage for your tanks." In your facsimile of March 6, you characterize the occurrence as "tank deterioration," and deny payment
for "the leaked oil."
S. W. Energy has not filed a claim for the damaged tank, but
only for the lost oil. Thus, your initial analysis of the claim
as a claim for damage to the tank was not only misplaced, it has
apparently led to an incorrect analysis of the claim for lost
oil. Furthermore, the loss did not occur due to "seepage" or
"leaked oil." The subject tank and another identical tank at the
same location have operated for years without any leakage or
seepage. Both tanks are closely monitored by both by the operator and the Bureau of Land Management. There was no evidence of
leakage in the subject tank prior to the failure, and the identical tank continues in use without any evidence of deterioration
or failure. The loss which occurred on November 2 6 was caused by
the sudden and unexpected failure of the tank — not by seepage
or leaks due to deterioration.

\X5

Continental Insurance
April 10, 1996
Page 3
In your letter of February 8 you also state:
The repairer (Double Tank Corporation) states
in his report, "The apparent cause is age and
wear and tear."
This comment is difficult to reconcile for two reasons.
First, S. W. Energy has not made a claim for the tank. Second,
and more importantly, there is no foundation for any "report" by
Double Tank Corporation. Double Tank did not "repair" the tank
and did not even examine the tank or investigate its failure.
Double Tank is merely a distributor of new tanks. Its delivery
crew simply moved the failed tank to a storage area and delivered
two new tanks. Double Tank was not retained to investigate or
examine the tanks, and it is doubtful that the Double Tank
delivery crew would have been competent to investigate the
condition of the old tanks in any event, even if they had been
asked to conduct such an investigation. Furthermore, as a
distributor of new tanks, Double Tank has an inherent conflict of
interest with respect to any opinion regarding existing tanks.1
Any comment which may have been made by an employee of Double
Tank regarding the failed tank would be mere speculation at best.
It is certainly not a "report" based on investigation by an
impartial, competent "repairer."
As the adjuster should have observed when he examined the
tank himself, there is no evidence of rust, deterioration or
corrosion near the point of failure in the subject tank. In
fact, because the primary component of the crude oil produced in
this field is paraffin, the subject tank was thoroughly coated by
paraffin on the inside as a result of usage, and was specially
treated by the manufacturer on the outside, effectively preventing corrosion. The protective paraffin layer had to be removed
by steam-cleaning in order even to evaluate the tank's condition
following its failure.
In addition to the fact that the tank failure was not caused
by corrosion or wear and tear in the first place, your reliance
on the corrosion exclusion of the policy reflects an even more
fundamental error in the original analysis of the claim under the
plain language of the policy.

Double Tank's purported comments may be more easily understood in light
of the fact that Double Tank attempted to collect substantial overcharges for
the new tanks above the agreed contract price and threatened punitive action
against S. W. Energy if it did not pay the excess claim, even further undermining Double Tank's impartiality and credibility.

Continental Insurance
April 10, 1996
Page 4
The policy covers both equipment and crude oil. It insures
against "direct
physical loss of or damage to" the covered
property. Paragraph 5A, upon which you erroneously relied in
refusing coverage, excludes "loss or damage caused by" wear and
tear, corrosion, rust, etc.
If, and only if, (i) the policy had covered only the tanks
(and not the oil itself), (ii) the tank failure had been caused
by corrosion, and (iii) S. W. Energy had filed a claim for damage
to the tank, then the position which you have taken might have
been justified. In that event the "direct physical damage" would
have been the damage to the tank caused by the corrosion. In
that scenario, the loss of the oil would have been an
indirect
physical loss, and might not have been covered.
In actual fact, the oil is separately covered by the insurance policy, in addition to the tanks and equipment. The oil did
not rust, corrode or wear out. The "direct physical loss" was
the dumping of the oil onto the ground, which was caused by the
sudden and unexpected failure of the tank. Even if there had
been corrosion, the corrosion would only have been
indirectly
related to the physical loss of the oil, and the policy exclusion
would not have applied in any event. An insurer could as easily
argue that there would be no coverage for lost oil if a truck
crashed into a storage tank because of rusty brakes or a worn out
steering wheel.
In Utah, insurance policies are not construed according to
hypertechnical interpretations designed to nullify the very
coverage for which the insured paid premiums, but are given the
plain meaning which an insured layman would assign under the
circumstances. Even if there had been an ambiguity in the clear
policy language., the Utah courts would resolve that ambiguity in
favor of the insured. In any event, in view of the plain language of this policy, there is simply no good faith basis to deny
coverage for the lost oil in this case.
To summarize then, S. W. Energy Corporation is entitled to
coverage for the lost crude oil. The crude oil did not rust,
corrode or wear out in normal usage. It was lost through a
sudden and unexpected failure of a storage tank. There is no
evidence of corrosion or wear and tear with respect to the tank,
and even if corrosion had indirectly contributed to the accident,
the corrosion exclusion still would not have prevented coverage
for the direct physical loss of the oil.
We would appreciate your reviewing the claim in light of the
correct facts and applicable policy provisions, and then reim-

In

Continental Insurance
April 10, 1996
Page 5
bursing S. W. Energy for the lost oil within 15 days following
your receipt of this letter.
Thank you for your cooperation and assistance. If you have
any questions, or if you would like to discuss the matter further, please do not hesitate to call.
Very truly yours,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

Robert P. Hill
RPH/hmm
cc: Mr. Richard P. Smoot
Mr. Kenneth Osborne

0171336
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G A R R E T T
ENGINEERS, INC.

PREPARED FOR

MR. JOE FERRO
CNA INSURANCE
3137 EAST AVENUE Q-15
PALMDALE, CALIFORNIA 93550

CONCERNING

S & W ENERGY TANK FADLURE
OUR CASE NO. 0596TO15439

FORENSIC DIVISION • 2662 E. Del AmoBlvd, Carson, CA 90221 • P.O. Box 91659, Long Beach, CA 90809-1659 • (800)229-3647 • (310)537-3647 • FAX (310) 537-1933

G A R R E T T
ENGIN EEflS,

INC .

PHOTOGRAPH
(1 Photograph)

ho

G A R R E T T
ENGINEERS,

May 28, 1996

INC.

Mr. Joe Ferro
CNA INSURAiNCE
3137 East Avenue Q-15
Palmdale, California 93550
Re: S & W ENERGY TANK FAILURE
Date of Loss: 11-17-95
Your Insured: Richard Smoot DBA S & W Energy
Claim No.: 5406C3029
Our Case No.: 0596TO15439
Dear Mr. Ferro:

ASSIGNMENT:
GARRETT ENGINEERS, INC. was assigned to determine the cause and origin of the failed oil
holding tank, allowing the contents to leak.

CONCLUSIONS;
The following observations were made:

There was no fitting failure; all fitting connections were in good condition.

The tank was fabricated in 1963. Inside of the tank, centered on the bottom, is a small pipe
support frame to support the recirculating lines.

FORENSIC DIVISION • 2662 E. Del Amo Blvd., Carson, CA 90221 • P.O. Box 91659, Long Beach, CA 90809-1659 • (800)229-3647 • (310)537-3647 ' FAX (310) 537-1933

A R B E TT
EMQ,NEERS ,NC

Re: S & WEnergy Tank Failure - 2

Each leg of the frame was welded to the tank bottom. It appears that the original frame to tank
welds did not pass inspection; and at least two of the welds were repaired.

Along the side of the welded connection that was completely rusted away was a hole
approximately 2 inches wide. This was the source of the oil spill (see Sketch #4) and the
attached photo).

DISCUSSION:
I made arrangements with Joe Ferro of CNA Insurance and Richard Smoot of S & W Energy
to visit the oil field where the failed tank is located.

I met with Jim Pinneo of S & W Energy at the site on May 5, 1996.

The primary structural plate welds, both externally and internally, were in good condition and
were well made. No primary structural damage of any kind was visible.

Inside of the tank, centered on the bottom, is a small pipe support frame (see Sketch #1). The
purpose of the support frame is to support the recirculating lines (usually 4 to 6 lines each,
approximately 3/4 to 1 inch nominal pipe).

G AR R E T T
E N G I N E E R , INC.

Re: s & WEnergy Tank Failure - 3

Each leg of the frame was welded to the tank bottom (see Sketch #2). These welds were not
of the same quality as those of the primary structure. One fillet was poorly made, and two were
applied by a different welding method. The fourth was completely rusted away.

From these welds, I am led to believe that the support frame was added after the tank was
fabricated. Also, it appears that the original frame to tank welds did not pass inspection; and
at least two of the welds were repaired.

Along the side of the welded connection that was completely rusted away was a hole
approximately 2 inches wide (see Sketch #4) and the attached photo. This was the source of the
oil spill.

The 2 inch hole had rusted from the outside. It rusted from the outside in because of a common
error made during field fabrications.

When the support frame was welded to the thin 1/4 inch bottom plate, a heat affected zone
around the welded area was created (see Sketch #3). Experience has taught us that without
proper protective measures, the metal in the heat affected zone rusts at a faster rate than metal
that has not been affected by high welding temperatures.

After the support frame was welded to the tank bottom, the tank bottom should have been
cleaned (power tool or sand blast) and protected with a coat of primer and a coat of paint.

i.

G A R R E T T
E N G I N E E R S , INC

Re: S & WEnergy Tank Failure - 4

However, elevating a storage tank of this size and taking protective measures are time
consuming, expensive task that many fabricators choose not to perform.

The end user of the tank would not have known that the tank, as a whole unit, was not properly
fabricated. Ordinary visual inspections would not have shown the existence of a problem.

Everyone involved in this matter should be reminded that the tank did last for thirty-three years.

Thank you for calling GARRETT ENGINEERS, INC. If you have any questions regarding this
report, or if you need any further assistance, please contact our office.

Respectfully submitted,
GARRETT ENGINEERS, INC.

Roger Phillips, P.E.
Mechanical Engineer
RP:hm
Enclosures:

1 Photograph
Sketches #1, #2, #3, and #4)
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Re: S &. W Energy Tank Failure - 1
Photograph

Photo 1.
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SKETCHES
(4 Sketches)

IH<*

SMALL PIPE SUPPORT FRAME
APPRDX 16' SQUARE X 6' HIGH
CONSTRUCTED DF 1 1/2' X 1 1/2' ANGLES
WELDED DN CENTER DF TANK BDTTDM

TANK
C15'-6'H X

VERTICAL SECTIDN
THRU TANK
16'DIA>

TANK FABRICATED BY AMERICAN STEEL TANK CDRP - MARCH, 1963.
OWNED BY s&W ENERGY CO.
LDCATED IN THE STATE OF UTAH - APPRDX 10 MILES FROM THE
EXIT #173 ON INTERSTATE HIGHWAY 170,

SKETCH ttl

EACH LEG WAS WELDED TD THE TANK BQTTDM
WITH A FILLET WELD ALDNG THE OUTSIDE EDGES

HDRIZDNTAL SECTIDN
THRU SUPPORT LEGS

VIEW A
SKETCH #2

HEAT AFFECTED ZONE
THRU TANK BDTTDM
PLATE WQULD BE A
SMALL AREA AROUND
EACH VELD

HDRIZDNTAL SECTIDN
THRU SUPPDRT LEGS

VIEW B

SKETCH #3

1
TANK BDTTDM HAD A HDLE
APPRDX 2' ACCRDSS
LDCATED ARQUND DNE DF
THE PIPE SUPPDRT LEGS
APPRDX AS SHOWN
TANK BDTTDM RUSTED FROM
THE DUTSIDE IN ALONG
THE PATH DF THE WELD

L
HORIZONTAL SECTION
THRU SUPPORT LEGS

VIEW C
o

SKETCH t+4

Tab J
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SCOTT W. CHRISTENSEN, UBN 0649
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE, P.C,
Attorneys for Defendants
4 Triad Center, Ste. 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
Telephone: (801) 3 63-7 611
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
S. W. ENERGY CORPORATION,
Utah corporation

a

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
v.
CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY
and MARINE OFFICE OF AMERICA
CORPORATION,

Civil No. 960905357
Judge William A. Thorne

Defendants.
Plaintiff's and defendants, cross motions for summary
judgment having come before the court on Monday, June 23, 1997,
John A. Adams appearing on behalf of S.W. Energy Corporation, and
Scott W. Christensen appearing on behalf of Continental Insurance
Company and Marine Office of American Corporation ("MOAC") .

The

court, having reviewed the pleadings and motions on file, having
heard oral argument of counsel and being fully advised in the
premises, now enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Order:

TXt

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The hole in the tank in which the oil was being

stored was caused by rust.
2.

The oil was lost because of the hole in the tank.

3.

The oil itself was not rusted or corroded. However,

since the hole in the tank was caused by rust or corrosion, the
loss of the oil was also caused by rust or corrosion.
4.

The decision by MOAC to deny coverage was the result

of a reasonable reading of the language of the exclusion.
5.

MOAC denied coverage in a timely fashion.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

When

the

language

of a policy

of

insurance

is

susceptible to two or more plausible interpretations, the language
is ambiguous and must be construed in favor of coverage to the
insured.
2.

The

language

in

the

MOAC

policy

of

insurance

covering exclusions from coverage contained only one plausible
interpretation and therefore is clear and unambiguous.
3.

The loss of the oil was caused by rust or corrosion

within the meaning of the exclusion from coverage in the insurance
policy.

2

4.

Based

upon the clear

language of the contract,

defendant MOAC properly denied coverage for the claim for lost oil
presented by S.W. Energy.
5.

S.W. Energy's motion for summary judgment is denied.

6.

Because MOAC's denial of coverage was proper and

timely, MOAC is not subject to any claim for bad faith, fraudulent
insurance acts, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty or punitive
damages.
7.

An insurer does not violate its obligation of good

faith and fair dealing to an insured by denying coverage when an
insured claims a different interpretation of the insurance policy
so long as the insurer has no bad motive in denying coverage.
8.

MOAC's cross motion for summary judgment is granted.

ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied.

Defendants'

motion for summary judgment on all claims is granted.
DATED this

S*

day of ^upLuiabui, 1997.
BY THE COURTi'V\

WILLIAM A. -THBfttaB
DISTRICT COURT^OUDGE

£?
/

'
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:

fr^H,. tf. Cidt
OHN A. ADAMS
Attorney for Plaintiff
245908.01/JM
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